Algiers And Beyond

The story of the convoy from its departure in Scotland up to the torpedoing of the troopship Strathallan is told elsewhere  (Strathallan History and Strathallan Story). For the purposes of this website however, the story of the torpedoing of the troopship Cameronia begins here, moments after the Strathallan was topedoed.

Captain D.W. Bone in command of the troopship Circassia (behind the Strathallan when she was torpedoed) remembers the torpedoing of the Strathallan as a strangely anti-climactic event.

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“To us, in her next astern, it was a curiously quiet, deliberate and unspectacular calamity. It took a moment of thought to realise that the great ship ahead-still upright and steering her course –had been hit. We saw no flash or flame of the exploding torpedo. The underwater shock was not severe nor the sound remarkable but that deadening might have been affected by the positions of the ships. By her immediate whistle signal of casualty, it was broadcast that she had been hit on the port side”

As the angle of the current zig-zag that the convoy was executing, the Strathallan had in fact interposed her hull between the Circassia and the torpedo explosion thus deflecting the full sound and shock of the blast.

Jim Lafferty – Steward Cameronia:

“Late in the evening, the troopship on our starboard side, the Strathallan a P & O liner of 24,000 tons was torpedoed, she had 5,000 troops onboard. There was some hectic manoeuvring by Destroyers in trying to locate the U-boat, depth charge attacks commenced almost immediately”

Captain Kelly of the Cameronia now took command of the convoy.

He decided not to fire rockets to mark the change over.

James Hainey – Crewman Dunnottar Castle:

“One troopship had been torpedoed, to attempt rescue, closing down engines would have left Dunnottar Castle a sitting duck placing thousands more at risk. The unfortunate soldiers and nurses in the water had to fend for themselves”

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“We had the course, the speed and zig-zag were as previously ordered: there was no need for signals and their absence augered well for steadying progress. It seemed long ere we overhauled and passed her, although the interval, at 15 knots, was only a matter of a few minutes. She had carried way for a distance, then had stopped and fallen out of line with the red signal of ‘Not under command’ throwing a satanic glare on her funnel and masts and upper works. There was no sign of alarm or disorder on her broad decks. I could see many Army nurses in their white coifs mustering on her promenade and troops lining up to the ‘Birkenhead Drill’ on the decks below. If our approach seemed slow, our departure appeared surprisingly rapid as we left her to her fate”

This was how the remainder of KMF-5 left the Strathallan still zig-zaging and navigating their way to Algiers. They were joined by the ‘Force H’ Destroyers HMS Eskimo and HMS Lamerton, both of whom had left Algiers to assist in the A/S and air screen of the approaching Merchantmen the moment that they had received orders to do so, presumably the moment the report came in about a ship having been “Tin fished” or after having seen the white distress rockets light up the night sky.

Austen Parker – Royal Signal Corps Cameronia:

“Part of our convoy left us for Oran. Soon we had news the Strathallan, a big three funnelled (Austen was clearly mistaken in this regard as the Strathallan only had one funnel) steamer had been  torpedoed off Oran. We were told she would make port under her own steam”

ULTRA – Decrypted German cipher traffic 1430 hours on the 21^st December 1942:

“Bomber operation against convoys near Algiers cancelled owing to weather. (Furthermore) 10 to 15 torpedo aircraft from KG 26 (KG was short for Kampfgeschwader or Combat Wing – {see later}) expected to land Elmas after dark after operation against same target”

WO2 Jones – Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Cameronia:

“That evening we anchored off Algiers which from the ship looked quite modern”

Whilst the ship was in the port in Algiers the troops were free to move around the ship (within reason) as they were during most of the voyage, including going up on deck – weather permitting. That evening, Richard Day found himself in the ‘Guard cabin’ on the main deck passing the time with the duty Corporal. It was the job of the duty Corporal to see that people who were not supposed to be on deck during “Action Stations” (essentially non-crew members) were not on deck. Different men from different units were allotted deck guard duties throughout the duration of the convoy. They had a cabin that they used as a ‘Guard cabin’ and for the most part probably wandered around looking purposeful, thankful for both the little bit of privacy that the position afforded as well as being away from the humidity, smell of BO and stale vomit below decks.

At this time, the Axis powers were still in control of the airfields in Tunisia, Tripoli and all of them in Sardinia, Sicily and Italy. This had of course meant that from the moment ‘Operation Torch’ had ‘lit up’ Axis air attacks from their bases in the Mediterranean had become more frequent and heavier. By late December the captured port of Bône in Algeria became the Allies’ advanced base for seaborne reinforcements for the First Army. As such, it was the subject of regular night-time bombing raids. In fact, enemy air activity at this time was so severe that no large troopships were allowed to travel east of Algiers. The stretch of water between Algiers and Bône attracted many names from the Allies, George Chadwick knew it simply as “Suicide Alley”.

As troops still needed to be ferried east of Algiers, the Allies initiated a troop ferry service using four smaller faster requisitioned Merchantmen converted into ‘Landing Ship Infantry’ (LSI) vessels. LSIs were ships capable of carrying landing craft, into which soldiers could transfer for the final stages of an assault and the four LSIs used for this troop ferry service were the Queen Emma, the Princess Beatrix, (formerly known respectively as the Koningen Emma and the Prinses Beatrix when they were engaged in transporting passengers between the Hook of Holland and Harwich), the Royal Scotsman and the Royal Ulsterman. As they travelled at night they quickly became known as the “Moonlight Squadron” and between they they were capable of transporting up to 3,300 troops at any one time. Although fast enough to outrun any Axis power submarine, the Moonlight Squadron were nevertheless still subject to “Considerable hazard from bombing and Torpedo Bombers”.

 The Moonlight Squadron

Despite the knowledge that KMF-5 was already vulnerable to U-boat attack, the powers that be had decided that KMF-5 was going to be the first ‘Large ship’ convoy since the start of ‘Operation Torch’ to travel east of Algiers and attempt to land troops at Bône. The reason being that General Eisenhower, had already stripped the back areas including Oran of all soldiers possible to make them available on the fighting line east of Bône for a massive Tunisian offensive to take place on the morning of the 24th December with hopes of overrunning Tunisia by New Years Day.

In order for there to be as many troops on the fighting line as possible, Admiral Cunningham had reluctantly agreed to send a portion of KMF-5 to Bône to carry many thousands of reinforcements almost up to the fighting line who would otherwise have never got there in time overland for the planned offensive. It is interesting to speculate whether the Strathallan would also have received new orders in Algiers to carry on to Bône had she not been torpedoed. Cunningham was reluctant because he knew the risks involved. If the threat of further U-boat attack was not enough, KMF-5 would now also be vulnerable to Axis level and torpedo bomber as well as E-boat attack. Just before dusk, a Naval launch delivered new orders to each of the three ships anchored in the bay of Algiers and the Coxswain told the Master of the Circassia, Captain Bone that “Evil birds were on the wing and the port would be blacked out very quickly and soon”. Although each ship received orders that only related to that particular vessel, the orders overall revealed, that both the Cameronia and the Circassia were now to be bound for Bône, whereas the Clan Lamont already at its supposed port of disembarkation was now going to be bound for Bougie. Captain Bone acutely aware of the situation was not at all thrilled at the prospect of:

“Travelling another 250 miles in the direction of the enemy airfields in Sardinia” 

especially as his particular orders had accidentally omitted to specify any Escort. How rumours of “Evil birds being on the wing” had become known is unclear, however, the ENIGMA message is clear:

ULTRA - Decrypted German cipher traffic ‘Late afternoon’on the 21^st December 1942: “KG 60 attack with all Forces on the reported shipping convoy. Reconnaissance aircraft over the convoy to send out reports. Convoy will be attacked at the same time by KG 30 and KG 26. Time of attack will follow” 

A Geschwader (in this case a Kampfgeschwader {KG}) was divided into several usually three Gruppen (I, II & III) and a Gruppe became the usual autonomous Operational tactical combat unit within the Geschwader. Each Gruppe at this time consisted of three Staffeln, (or Squadrons) containing (numbers permitting) 10 to 16 aircraft each. The number of ground personnel for a bomber Staffel (or Squadron) was around 80. Each Staffel of a bomber unit was divided into aKette of three aircraft flying in a ‘V’ formation. Transferred from Norway to the Mediterranean at the beginning of November 1942, (to meet the anticipated threat of Allied landings in North Africa) and recognisable by the ‘Vestigium Leonis’ (Footprints of the Lion) Squadron markings on the nose of their aircraft, Kampfgeschwader 26 were getting ready.

KG 26 was the main Anti-shipping Geschwader of the Luftwaffe and by now, it should have had 120 aircraft. In fact, by mid December 1942, enemy action together with political and logistical problems had conspired to ensure that it only possessed 61, of which only 18 were operational. Both I & III Gruppe (I/KG 26 & III/KG 26) were torpedo bomber units, now located in Grosseto Italy and were to be the largest force that attacked convoy KMF-5.

As such, at 1920 on the 21^st, 14 aircraft of KG 26 (five Heinkel (He 111 {the H-6 variant} from I/KG 26 and nine Junkers (Ju 88 {the A-4 variant} from III/KG 26) took off from Grosseto towards the convoy. After having attacked the convoy, they were to land at Elmas. Six He 111-H-6s from I/KG 26 either flew from Grosseto to Catania in Sicily to await further orders or were already at Catania.

Sardinia and Sicily were used as Absprungplätze (advanced landing grounds) for staging attacks against enemy targets. As reported earlier, Elmas airfield in Sardinia was to be the Absprungplätze for the returning planes that had taken off from Grosseto whilst the aircraft in Catania would attack from there. The splitting up of aircraft amongst different airfields (and in this case different islands) was not uncommon especially at Absprungplätze because being closer to the Allies, these airfields were more vulnerable to air attack themselves. It was simply an attempt to safeguard their numbers if one of the airfields was attacked.

As mentioned in the German cipher traffic KG 60 and KG 30 initially readied themselves to attack the convoy. Specifically, the 1^st and 2^nd Staffel of I/KG 60 based in Elmas and equipped with Ju 88A-4 level bombers together with the II & III Gruppen of KG 30 both based in Comiso (Sicily) with approximately 40 Ju 88 A level bombers prepared themselves to launch a simultaneous attack on the convoy. Given the air worthiness of their aircraft Bodenpersonal at I/KG 60 performed miracles and managed to take the number of operationally capable aircraft at their disposal from three to eight by late afternoon of the 21st.

The author has tried to locate photos of aircraft belonging to I/KG 60 without success but this may be due to the fact that this particular unit was only in existence for a few short months. This probably also explains the lack of a unit emblem for I/KG 60.

It is clear from official records (thankfully for the convoy) that the bad weather responsible for cancelling the bombing raid only affected the aircraft from KG 30. All 40 aircraft from both the II & III Gruppen of KG 30 in Comiso were grounded and they did not take part in any attack on KMF-5. Nevertheless, a bombing raid on the port of Algiers did take place that evening {see later} so maybe some of the aircraft from KG 30 did manage to take off and attack the port. The weather in Elmas and Catania remained excellent and the flight from KG 26 that had taken off fromGrosseto was now nearing a target guided by the Fühlunghalter. Meanwhile, back inAlgiers, the final preparations for the last phase of KMF-5 were being made and just prior to weighing anchor, a pair of Destroyers began ‘Making smoke’ to produce a smoke screen. Shortly thereafter, they and the three Merchant-men anchored in the bay, left theport ofAlgiers, it was 2200.

Richard Day was still on deck at the time as he had figured that they were a sitting duck in port and felt that up on deck was as safe as anywhere. He heard someone say “Blimey, we’re moving”

They navigated their way through the mine-swept channel and began to make their way east of Algiers and into “Suicide Allye”. Escorts that operated between Algiers and Bône became knows as “The Bomb Alley Taxicab Company” and the shuttling between Algiers and Bône at this time was simply know as “The Bomb Alley Taxicab Company run”. The Escort Commander was HMS Aurora commanded by Rear Admiral Sir C.H.J Harcourt CBE and the initial cruising order for the final portion of KMF-5 was:

The Ocean Escort (no doubt to the relief of Captain Bone) for this, the final rearranged portion of KMF-5 from Algiers to Bône consisted of the following Royal Naval vessels:

HMS SCYLLA	Light Cruiser	In port at Algiers
HMS AURORA	Light Cruiser	In port at Algiers
HMS WHEATLAND	Destroyer	In port at Algiers
HMS LAMERTON	Destroyer	In port at Algiers
HMS QUALITY	Destroyer	In port at Algiers

George Chadwick – Steward Cameronia:

“Are warned to keep our guns manned as we may expect a torpedo attack from the air”

Once they had left port the Cameronia’s bells sounded “Action Stations” and Richard Day, WO2 Jones and all non-crew personnel had to return to their messdeck. During any type of attack, whether it be directed towards the ship or in this case the port of Algiers, the only personnel allowed on deck at such times were those responsible for dealing with the attack. It was the job of the duty Corporal in the ‘Guard cabin’ on deck to ensure that no-one who should not be on deck was on deck. It was clear that the previously “Cancelled” bombing raid on the port of Algiers was actually going ahead at least in part.

WO2 Jones – Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Cameronia:

“We heard a terrific barrage going up. Few minutes later all was quiet”

The convoy silently continued east but the duty Corporal and the DEMS Gunners bore witness to the port of Algiers being bombed together with the port’s Anti-Aircraft guns being fired in return. Hardly had the duty Corporal and the DEMS Gunners finished witnessing one aerial attack, when another one appeared to be beginning ahead of them.

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“We had barely navigated the swept channel and taken up station abeam of the Commodore and with the Clan Lamont astern when a surprising barrage of ack ack gunfire was seen at some distance ahead on our course. There appeared to be a number of ships engaged, they were proceeding to the eastward and soon it was apparent that we were overtaking them”

This was the convoy that the Fühlunghalter from the II Fliegerkorps had discovered and had reported the whereabouts of and this  was the convoy, of the 14 aircraft that initially set off from Sardinia, only eight had managed to locate the convoy. The other six had by this time, managed to get lost. A failure to locate a convoy was not uncommon when flying at night over open sea (where there are no landmarks to locate a moving target that would alter course anyway. Blackout regulations would have assisted in hiding the convoy, however, as the moon was almost full this would have assisted those crews in locating the whereabouts of the convoy. No assistance would have been forthcoming from the Fühlunghalter because if you do not know where you are and have nothing to take a bearing from the plotted position of the convoy is of little help. Unaware of the orders the Cameronia had received, the Master of the Circassia was expecting some response from his convoy Commodore.

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“An immediate signal of alteration of course from the Cameronia and was keenly on the lookout for it. But none came. I thought it strange that we should be steering into trouble, for the gunfire blazed and died away in sudden bursts of tracer that indicated air attack upon the convoy ahead. There was still time to haul to the northward or return to seek a precarious refuge under the smoke blanket in Algiers Bay” 

It was at this point that Captain Bone realised that the Commodore would have received his own orders that would have contained information that he had not been privy to and he realised that his job was simply to obey the Commodore. He continued on course towards the inferno.

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“The convoy that we were approaching so rapidly seemed composed of small ships and had an odd formation about it and it was towards this that we steered. We had heard of a group of small fast ships called the ‘Moonlight Squadron’ formed to relieve the larger and more vulnerable transports of the hazardous eastward passage. Would this be the ‘Moonlighters’ and their Destroyer Escort we were about to join company ?”

The Moonlight Squadron packed with troops had in fact left Algiers en-route for Bougie a few hours earleir. The convoy that they were approaching not overtaking was convoy TE-10. The ‘TE’ series (T=Torce, E=Eastward) started in November 1942, and were local Mediterranean convoys. This particular convoy in the TE series consisted of the following Merchant ships and Escorts:

Merchant Ships

Fintra,	(originally from Oran en-route to Phillipville)
Transvaal,	(originally from Oran en-route to Phillipville)
Borde,	(originally from Oran en-route to Bougie)
La Perla,	(originally from Oran en-route to Bougie)

Escorts

HMS ESKIMO	Destroyer en-route to Bougie
HMS WISHART	Destroyer en-route to Bougie
HMS ZETLAND	Destroyer en-route to Bougie
HMS BICESTER	Destroyer en-route to Bougie

These ships were now embroiled in a fire fight, which the final components of KMF-5 continued to steer towards.

Austen Parker – Royal Signal Corps Cameronia:

“It was a brilliant full moon and it was not long before we knew we had been spotted”

At 2230 “Action Stations” onboard the Cameronia were sounded. Of the eight torpedo bombers of KG 26 that had found TE-10 that night, three were He 111 H-6s and five were Ju 88 A-4s.

Captain D.W. Bone – Circassia:

“We were not left long in ignorance of what the unknown ships had been firing at. Some bright shaft of moonlight had touched our three large hulls and revealed us to attacking torpedo bombers” 

As per their training at the Torpedo Bomber School in Grosseto, the night bombers from KG 26 used the path of the moon as a ‘Flight path’ and guide and began to position themselves to their advantage.